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Descendants of Arnulf Bishop of Metz Father of Ansegis


4. Charles Martel The Hammer

Charles Martel (or, in modern English, Charles the Hammer) (23 August 68622 October 741) was proclaimed Mayor of the Palace, ruling the Franks in the name of a titular King, and proclaimed himself Duke of the Franks (the last four years of his reign he did not even bother with the facade of a King) and by any name was de facto ruler of the Frankish Realms. He expanded his rule over all three of the Frankish kingdoms: Austrasia, Neustria and Burgundy. Martel was born in Herstal, or present-day Wallonia, Belgium, the illegitimate son of Pippin the Middle and his concubine Alpaida (or Chalpaida).

He is best remembered for winning the Battle of Tours in 732, which has traditionally been characterized as an action saving Europe from the Umayyad expansionism that had conquered Iberia. "There were no further Umayyad invasions of Frankish territory, and Charles's victory has often been regarded as decisive for world history, since it preserved western Europe from Muslim conquest and Islamization." [1]

Though primarily remembered simply as the leader of the Christian army that prevailed at Tours, Charles Martel was a truly giant figure of the Middle Ages. A brilliant general in an age generally bereft of the same, he is considered the forefather of western heavy cavalry, chivalry, founder of the Carolingian Empire, (which was named after him), and a catalyst for the feudal system that would see Europe through the Middle Ages. (Although some recent scholars have suggested he was more of a beneficiary of the feudal system than a knowing agent for social change, others continue to see him as the primary catalyst for the feudal system.)[1]

Consolidation of power

Charles stood to inherit nothing of his father's (Pippin the Middle) office because of his illegitimacy. In December 714, Pippin the Middle died. Pepin, at his wife Plectrude's urging, designated Theudoald, his grandson by Plectrude's son Grimoald, as his heir to his office. This was immediately opposed by the nobles, as Theudoald was a child of eight years. Moving quickly, Plectrude seized Charles Martel, her husband's eldest surviving son, a bastard, and put him in prison in Cologne. This prevented temporarily an uprising against Theudoald in Austrasia, but another uprising occurred in the neighbouring Frankish territory, Neustria, over rights to the Frank title.


Civil war of 715-718

In 715, the Neustrian nobles proclaimed one Ragenfrid (mayor of their palace) on behalf of, and apparently with the support of, Dagobert III, the young king, who in fact had the legal authority to select a mayor, though by this time the Merovingian dynasty had lost most such regal powers.

The Austrasians were not to be left supporting a woman and her young boy for long. Before the end of the year, Charles Martel had escaped from prison and been acclaimed mayor by the nobles of Austrasia. The Neustrians had been attacking Austrasia, and the nobles were waiting for a strong man to lead them against their invading countrymen. That year, Dagobert died and the Neustrians proclaimed Chilperic II king without the support of the rest of the Frankish people.

In 716, Chilperic and Ragenfrid together led an army into Austrasia. The Neustrians allied with another invading force under Radbod, King of the Frisians, and met Charles in battle near Cologne, still held by Plectrude. Charles had little time to gather men, or prepare, and the result was the only defeat of his life. In fact, he fled the field as soon as he realized he did not have the time or the men to prevail, retreating to the mountains of the Eifel. The king and his mayor then turned to besiege their other rival in the city and took it and the treasury, and received the recognition of both Chilperic as king and Ragenfrid as mayor. Plectrude surrendered on Theudoald's behalf.

At this juncture, events turned in favour of Charles. Having made the proper preparations, Charles fell upon the triumphant army near Malmedy as it was returning to its own province, and, in the ensuing Battle of Amblève, routed it and it fled. Several things were notable about this battle, in which Charles set the pattern for the remainder of his military career: First, he appeared where his enemies least expected him, while they were marching triumphantly home and far outnumbered him. He also attacked when least expected, at midday, when armies of that era traditionally were resting. Finally, he attacked them how they least expected it, by feigning a retreat to draw his opponents into a trap. The feigned retreat, next to unknown in Western Europe at that time—it was a traditionally eastern tactic—required both extraordinary discipline on the part of the troops and exact timing on the part of their commander. Charles, in this battle, had begun demonstrating the military genius that would mark his rule, in that he never attacked his enemies where, when, or how they expected, and the result was an unbroken victory streak that lasted until his death.

In Spring 717, Charles returned to Neustria with an army and confirmed his supremacy with a victory at Vincy, near Cambrai. He chased the fleeing king and mayor to Paris before turning back to deal with Plectrude and Cologne. He took the city and dispersed her adherents. He allowed both Plectrude and Theudoald to live, and treated them with kindness—unusual for those Middle Ages, when mercy to a former jailer, or a potential rival, was rare. On this success, he proclaimed one Clotaire IV king of Austrasia in opposition to Chilperic and deposed the archbishop of Rheims, Rigobert, replacing him with one Milo, a lifelong supporter.

After subjugating all Austrasia, he marched against Radbod and pushed him back into his territory, even forcing the concession of West Frisia (later Holland). He also sent the Saxons back over the Weser and thus secured his borders—in the name of the new king, of course. More than any other prior mayor of the palace, however, absolute power lay with Charles.

In 718, Chilperic responded to Charles' new ascendancy by making an alliance with Odo the Great (or Eudes, as he is sometimes known), the duke of Aquitaine, who had made himself independent during the civil war in 715, but was again defeated, at Soissons, by Charles. The king fled with his ducal ally to the land south of the Loire while Ragenfrid fled to Angers. Soon Clotaire IV died and Odo deserted Chilperic and, in exchange for recognising his dukeship, surrendered the king to Charles, who recognised his kingship over all the Franks in return for legitimate royal affirmation of his mayoralty, likewise over all the kingdoms (718).


Foreign wars from 718-732

The ensuing years were full of strife. Between 718 and 723, Charles secured his power through a series of victories: he won the loyalty of several important bishops and abbots (by donating lands and money for the foundation of abbeys such as Echternach), subjugated Bavaria and Alemannia, and defeated the pagan Saxons.

Having unified the Franks under his banner, Charles was determined to punish the Saxons who had invaded Austrasia. Therefore, late in 718, he laid waste their country to the banks of the Weser, the Lippe, and the Ruhr. He defeated them in the Teutoburg Forest. In 719, Charles seized West Frisia without any great resistance on the part of the Frisians, who had been subjects of the Franks but had seized control upon the death of Pippin. Although Charles did not trust the pagans, their ruler, Aldegisel, accepted Christianity. Charles sent Willibrord, bishop of Utrecht, the famous "Apostle to the Frisians" to convert the people. Charles also did much to support Winfrid, later Saint Boniface, the "Apostle of the Germans."

When Chilperic II died in 720, Charles appointed as his successor the son of Dagobert III, Theuderic IV, who was still a minor, and who occupied the throne from 720 to 737. Charles was now appointing the kings whom he supposedly served, rois fainéants who were mere puppets in his hands; by the end of his reign, he stopped even bothering to appoint any. At this time, Charles again marched against the Saxons. Then the Neustrians rebelled under Ragenfrid, who had been left the county of Anjou. They were easily defeated in 724, but Ragenfrid gave up his sons as hostages in return for keeping his county. This ended the civil wars of Charles' reign.

The next six years were devoted to strengthening Frankish authority over the dependent Germanic tribes. Between 720 and 723, Charles fought in Bavaria, where the Agilolfing dukes had gradually evolved into independent rulers, recently in alliance with Liutprand the Lombard. He forced the Alemanni to accompany him, and Duke Hugbert submitted to Frankish suzerainty. In 725 and 728, he again entered Bavaria and the ties of lordship seemed strong. From his first campaign, he brought back the Agilolfing princess Swanachild, who apparently became his concubine. In 730, he marched against Lantfrid, duke of Alemannia, who had also become independent, and killed him in battle. He forced the Alemanni to acknowledge Frankish suzerainty and did not appoint a successor to Lantfrid. Thus, southern Germany once more became part of the Frankish kingdom, as had northern Germany during the first years of the reign.

But as far back as 725, historian Paul K. Davis in 100 Decisive Battles says "After defeating Eudes, Charles turned his attention toward the Rhine River to secure his northeastern flank. He made war against the Saxons, Germans and Swabians until 725 when Moslem successes in southern Gaul diverted his attention." This is the first definitive proof from a major scholar that Charles began preparing from 725 on to face the Umayyads. His own realm secure, Charles began to prepare exclusively for the coming storm from the west. The new Governor of Al-Andulas had brought a huge force of Arab and Berber horsemen with him, and shortly thereafter invaded Gaul.

In 721, the emir of Córdoba had built up a strong army from Morocco, Yemen, and Syria to conquer Aquitaine, the large duchy in the southwest of Gaul, nominally under Frankish sovereignty, but in practice almost independent in the hands of the Odo the Great since the Merovingian kings had lost power. The invading Umayyad forces besieged the city of Toulouse, then Aquitaine's most important city. Odo immediately left to find help. He returned three months later just before the city was about to surrender and defeated the Umayyad invaders on June 9, 721, at the Battle of Toulouse. The victory was essentially the result of a classic enveloping movement on Odo's part. After Odo had originally fled, the Umayyad army became overconfident and ceased to maintain strong outer defenses around their siege camp and continue scouting. Thus, when Odo returned, he was able to launch a nearly complete surprise attack on the besieging force, scattering it at the first attack, and slaughtering units which were resting, or fled without weapons or armour.

According to Hanson, Charles had watched the Iberian situation since Toulouse, convinced the Muslims would return, and while he was securing his own realms, he was also preparing for war against the Umayyads. (Additionally, according to Bury he was enraged with Eudes for his treaty with Munza; Eudes, caught between the Muslims and Martel, tried to ally himself with anyone he could who would help him stay independent) By this time, Martel believed he needed a fulltime army, one he could train, as a core of veterans to add to the usual conscripts the Franks called up in time of war. During the Early Middle Ages, troops were only available after the crops had been planted and before harvesting time. To train the kind of infantry which would form the basis for the first standing army in the west since Rome's fall, Charles needed them year-round, and he needed to pay them, so their families could buy the food they would have otherwise grown. To obtain this money, he seized church lands and property, and used the funds to pay his soldiers. The same man who had secured the support of the ecclesia by donating land, seized some of it back between 724 and 732. The Church was enraged, and, for a time, it looked as though Charles might even be excommunicated for his actions. But then came a significant invasion.


Eve of Tours

It has been noted that Charles Martel could have pursued the wars against the Saxons; but he was determined to prepare for what he thought was a greater danger. Instead of concentrating on conquest to his east, he prepared for the storm gathering in the west. Well aware of the danger posed by the Umayyads after the Battle of Toulouse, in 721, he used the intervening years to consolidate his power, and gather and train the core of a veteran army. Victor Davis Hanson says that Martel used church lands and funds to secure personal loyalty to him, and provide a sound fiscal basis for assuring a steady supply of dependable troops during wartime. He had a core of seasoned veteran warriors, primarily infantry, who had been campaigning with him all over Europe. While not gathered solely to deal with the Umayyads - he had begun this process before the Battle of Toulouse even occurred - he was well aware that the Caliphate was the world's foremost military power, that it had conquered Iberia with a relatively small army in an 8 year campaign, and that while Toulouse had slowed their encrouchments in Gaul, it had by no means halted them.

The Umayyads were not aware, at that time, of the true strength of the Franks, or the fact that they were building a real army, not the typical barbarian hordes which had infested Europe after Rome's fall. They considered the Germanic tribes, including the Franks, simply barbarians and were not particularly concerned about them. The Arab Chronicles, the history of that age, show that awareness of the Franks as a growing military power came only after the Battle of Tours, when the Caliph expressed shock at his army's catastrophic defeat. Further, the Muslims had not bothered with the normal scouting of potential foes, for if they had, they surely would have noted Charles Martel as a force to be reckoned with. Martel's thorough domination of Europe from 717 on, and his sound defeat of all powers who contested his dominion, should have alerted the Moors that, not only was a real power rising from the ashes of the Western Roman Empire, but it was led by a truly gifted general. Thus, when they launched their great invasion of 732, they were not prepared for Martel and his Frankish army.

This, in retrospect, was a disastrous mistake. Emir Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi was a good general, but he made two mistakes: he failed to assess the strength of the Franks in advance of the invasion, assuming that they would not come to the aid of their Aquitanian cousins; and he failed to scout the movements of the Frankish army and Charles Martel. Had he done either, he would have curtailed his light horse ravaging throughout lower Gaul and marched at once, with his full power, against the Franks. This strategy would have nullified every advantage Charles had at Tours, as the invaders would have not been burdened with booty that played such a huge role in the battle. They would not been weakened in the battles they fought prior to Tours. (Although they lost relatively few men subduing Aquitane, the casualties they did suffer may have been significant at Tours).

Finally, the Umayyads would have bypassed weaker opponents, such as Odo, whom they could have dealt with later, while moving at once to force battle with the real power in Europe, and at least partially picked the battlefield. While some military historians point out that leaving enemies in one's rear is generally unwise, the Mongols proved that indirect attack and bypassing weaker foes to eliminate the strongest first was a devastatingly effective mode of invasion. In this case, those enemies posed virtually no danger, given the ease with which the Muslims destroyed them. The real danger was Charles, and the failure to scout Europe adequately proved fatal. Had Al Ghafiqi realized how thoroughly Martel had dominated Europe for 15 years, and how gifted a commander he was, he would not have allowed Charles Martel to pick the time and place the two powers would collide, which historians agree was pivotal to his victory.


Battle of Tours

Main article Battle of Tours.


Leadup and importance

"It was under one of their ablest and most renowned commanders, with a veteran army, and with every apparent advantage of time, place, and circumstance, that the Arabs made their great effort at the conquest of Europe north of the Pyrenees."[2]

Edward Shepherd CreasyThe Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World

The Cordoban emirate had previously invaded Gaul and had been stopped in its northward sweep at the Battle of Toulouse, in 721. The hero of that less celebrated event had been Odo the Great, Duke of Aquitaine, who was not the progenitor of a race of kings and patron of chroniclers. It has previously been explained how Odo defeated the invading Muslims, but when they returned, things were far different. The arrival in the interim of a new emir of Cordoba, Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi, who brought with him a huge force of Arabs and Berber horsemen, triggered a far greater invasion. Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi had been at Toulouse, and the Arab Chronicles make clear he had strongly opposed the Emir's decision not to secure outer defenses against a relief force, which allowed Odo and his relief force to attack with impunity before the Islamic cavalry could assemble or mount. Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi had no intention of permitting such a disaster again. This time the Umayyad horsemen were ready for battle, and the results were horrific for the Aquintanians. Odo, hero of Toulouse, was badly defeated in the Muslim invasion of 732 at the Battle of the River Garonne—where the western chroniclers state, "God alone knows the number of the slain"— and the city of Bordeaux was sacked and looted. Odo fled to Charles, seeking help. Charles agreed to come to Odo's rescue, provided Odo acknowledged Charles and his house as his Overlords, which Odo did formally at once. Thus, Odo faded into history while Charles marched into it. Charles was pragmatic; his former enemy Odo and his Aquitanian nobles formed the right flank of Charles' forces at Tours.

The Battle of Tours earned Charles the cognomen "Martel", for the merciless way he hammered his enemies. Many historians, including the great military historian Sir Edward Creasy, believe that had he failed at Tours, Islam would probably have overrun Gaul, and perhaps the remainder of western Christian Europe. Gibbon made clear his belief that the Umayyad armies would have conquered from Rome to the Rhine, and even England, with ease, had Martel not prevailed. Creasy said "the great victory won by Charles Martel ... gave a decisive check to the career of Arab conquest in Western Europe, rescued Christendom from Islam, [and] preserved the relics of ancient and the germs of modern civilization." Gibbon's belief that the fate of Christianity hinged on this battle is echoed by other historians including John B. Bury, and was very popular for most of modern historiography. It fell somewhat out of style in the twentieth century, when historians such as Bernard Lewis contended that Arabs had little intention of occupying northern France. More recently, however, many historians have tended once again to view the Battle of Tours as a very significant event in the history of Europe and Christianity. Equally, many, such as William Watson, still believe this battle was one of macrohistorical world-changing importance, if they do not go so far as Gibbons does rhetorically.

In the modern era, Matthew Bennett and his co-authors of "Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World", published in 2005, argue that "few battles are remembered 1,000 years after they are fought...but the Battle of Poitiers, (Tours) is an exception...Charles Martel turned back a Muslim raid that had it been allowed to continue, might have conquered Gaul." Michael Grant, author of "History of Rome", grants the Battle of Tours such importance that he lists it in the macrohistorical dates of the Roman era.

It is important to note however that modern western historians essentially fall into three camps. The first, those who believe Gibbons was right in his assessment that Martel saved Christianity and western civilization by this Battle are typified by Bennett, Paul Davis, Robert Martin, and educationalist Dexter B. Wakefield who writes in An Islamic Europe

A Muslim France? Historically, it nearly happened. But as a result of Martel’s fierce opposition, which ended Muslim advances and set the stage for centuries of war thereafter, Islam moved no farther into Europe. European schoolchildren learn about the Battle of Tours in much the same way that American students learn about Valley Forge and Gettysburg."[2]

The second camp of contemporary historians believe that a failure by Martel at Tours could have been a disaster, destroying what would become western civilization after the Renaissance. Certainly all historians agree that no power would have remained in Europe able to halt Islamic expansion had the Franks failed. William E. Watson, one of the most respected historians of this era, strongly supports Tours as a macrohistorical event, but distances himself from the rhetoric of Gibbons and Drubeck, writing, for example, of the battle's importance in Frankish, and world, history in 1993:

There is clearly some justification for ranking Tours-Poitiers among the most significant events in Frankish history when one considers the result of the battle in light of the remarkable record of the successful establishment by Muslims of Islamic political and cultural dominance along the entire eastern and southern rim of the former Christian, Roman world. The rapid Muslim conquest of Palestine, Syria, Egypt and the North African coast all the way to Morocco in the seventh century resulted in the permanent imposition by force of Islamic culture onto a previously Christian and largely non-Arab base. The Visigothic kingdom fell to Muslim conquerors in a single battle on the Rio Barbate in 711, and the Hispanic Christian population took seven long centuries to regain control of the Iberian peninsula. The Reconquista, of course, was completed in 1492, only months before Columbus received official backing for his fateful voyage across the Atlantic Ocean. Had Charles Martel suffered at Tours-Poitiers the fate of King Roderick at the Rio Barbate, it is doubtful that a "do-nothing" sovereign of the Merovingian realm could have later succeeded where his talented major domus had failed. Indeed, as Charles was the progenitor of the Carolingian line of Frankish rulers and grandfather of Charlemagne, one can even say with a degree of certainty that the subsequent history of the West would have proceeded along vastly different currents had ‘Abd ar-Rahman been victorious at Tours-Poitiers in 732.[3]

The final camp of western historians believe that Tours was vastly overrated. This view is typified by Alessandro Barbero, who writes, "Today, historians tend to play down the significance of the battle of Poitiers, pointing out that the purpose of the Arab force defeated by Charles Martel was not to conquer the Frankish kingdom, but simply to pillage the wealthy monastery of St-Martin of Tours".[4] Similarly, Tomaž Mastnak writes:

Modern historians have constructed a myth presenting this victory as having saved Christian Europe from the Muslims. Edward Gibbon, for example, called Charles Martel the savior of Christendom and the battle near Poitiers an encounter that changed the history of the world... This myth has survived well into our own times... Contemporaries of the battle, however, did not overstate its significance. The continuators of Fredegar's chronicle, who probably wrote in the mid-eighth century, pictured the battle as just one of many military encounters between Christians and Saracens - moreover, as only one in a series of wars fought by Frankish princes for booty and territory... One of Fredegar's continuators presented the battle of Poitiers as what it really was: an episode in the struggle between Christian princes as the Carolingians strove to bring Aquitaine under their rule.[5]

However, it is vital to note, when assessing Charles Martel's life, that even those historians who dispute the signficance of this one Battle as the event that saved Christianity, do not dispute that Martel himself had a huge effect on western history. Modern military historian Victor Davis Hanson acknowledges the debate on this battle, citing historians both for and against its macrohistorical placement:

Recent scholars have suggested Poitiers, so poorly recorded in contemporary sources, was a mere raid and thus a construct of western mythmaking or that a Muslim victory might have been preferable to continued Frankish dominance. What is clear is that Poitiers marked a general continuance of the successful defense of Europe, (from the Muslims). Flush from the victory at Tours, Charles Martel went on to clear southern France from Islamic attackers for decades, unify the warring kingdoms into the foundations of the Carolingian Empire, and ensure ready and reliable troops from local estates.".[6]



The Battle of Tours probably took place somewhere between Tours and Poitiers (hence its other name: Battle of Poitiers). The Frankish army, under Charles Martel, consisted mostly of veteran infantry, somewhere between 15,000 and 75,000 men. While Charles had some cavalry, they did not have stirrups, so he had them dismount and reinforce his phalanx. Odo and his Aquitanian nobility were also normally cavalry, but they also dismounted at the Battle's onset, to buttress the phalanx. Responding to the Umayyad invasion, the Franks had avoided the old Roman roads, hoping to take the invaders by surprise. Martel believed it was absolutely essential that he not only take the Umayyads by surprise, but that he be allowed to select the ground on which the battle would be fought, ideally a high, wooded plain where the Islamic horsemen, already tired from carrying armour, would be further exhausted charging uphill. Further, the woods would aid the Franks in their defensive square by partially impeding the ability of the Umayyad horsemen to make a clear charge.

From the Muslim accounts of the battle, they were indeed taken by surprise to find a large force opposing their expected sack of Tours, and they waited for six days, scouting the enemy and summoning all their raiding parties so their full strength was present for the battle. Emir Abdul Rahman was an able general who did not like the unknown at all, and he did not like charging uphill against an unknown number of foes who seemed well-disciplined and well-disposed for battle. But the weather was also a factor. The Germanic Franks, in their wolf and bear pelts, were more used to the cold, better dressed for it, and despite not having tents, which the Muslims did, were prepared to wait as long as needed, the fall only growing colder.

On the seventh day, the Umayyad army, mostly Berber and Arab horsemen and led by Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi, attacked. During the battle, the Franks defeated the Islamic army and the emir was killed. While Western accounts are sketchy, Arab accounts are fairly detailed in describing how the Franks formed a large square and fought a brilliant defensive battle. Rahman had doubts before the battle that his men were ready for such a struggle, and should have had them abandon the loot which hindered them, but instead decided to trust his horsemen, who had never failed him. Indeed, it was thought impossible for infantry of that age to withstand armoured cavalry.

Martel managed to inspire his men to stand firm against a force which must have seemed invincible to them, huge mailed horsemen, who, in addition, probably vastly outnumbered the Franks. In one of the rare instances where medieval infantry stood up against cavalry charges, the disciplined Frankish soldiers withstood the assaults even though, according to Arab sources, the Umayyad cavalry several times broke into the interior of the Frankish square. The scene is described in a translation of an Arab account of the battle from the Medieval Source Book:

"And in the shock of the battle the men of the North seemed like a sea that cannot be moved. Firmly they stood, one close to another, forming as it were a bulwark of ice; and with great blows of their swords they hewed down the Arabs. Drawn up in a band around their chief, the people of the Austrasians carried all before them. Their tireless hands drove their swords down to the breasts of the foe."

Both accounts agree that the Umayyad forces had broken into the square and were trying to kill Martel, whose liege men had surrounded him and would not be broken, when a trick Charles had planned before the battle bore fruit beyond his wildest dreams. Both Western and Muslim accounts of the battle agree that sometime during the height of the fighting, with the battle still in grave doubt, scouts sent by Martel to the Muslim camp began freeing prisoners. Fearing loss of their plunder, a large portion of the Muslim army abandoned the battle and returned to camp to protect their spoils. In attempting to stop what appeared to be a retreat, Abdul Rahman was surrounded and killed by the Franks, and what started as a ruse ended up a real retreat, as the Umayyad army fled the field that day. The Franks resumed their phalanx, and rested in place through the night, believing the battle would resume at dawn of the following morning.

The next day, when the Umayyad army did not renew the battle, the Franks feared an ambush. Charles at first believed the Muslims were attempting to lure him down the hill and into the open, a tactic he would resist at all costs. Only after extensive reconnaissance by Frankish soldiers of the Umayyad camp—which by both accounts had been so hastily abandoned that even the tents remained, as the Umayyad forces headed back to Iberia with what spoils remained that they could carry—was it discovered that the Muslims had retreated during the night. As the Arab Chronicles would later reveal, the generals from the different parts of the Caliphate, Berbers, Arabs, Persians and many more, had been unable to agree on a leader to take Abd er Rahman's place as Emir, or even to agree on a commander to lead them the following day. Only the Emir, Abd er Rahman, had a Fatwa from the Caliph, and thus absolute authority over the faithful under arms. With his death, and with the varied nationalities and ethnicities present in an army drawn from all over the Caliphate, politics, racial and ethnic bias, and personalities reared their head. The inability of the bickering generals to select anyone to lead resulted in the wholesale withdrawal of an army that might have been able to resume the battle and defeat the Franks.

Martel's ability to have Abd er Rahman killed through a clever ruse he had carefully planned to cause confusion, at the battle's apex, and his years spent rigorously training his men, combined to do what was thought impossible: Martel's Franks, virtually all infantry without armour, withstood both mailed heavy cavalry with 20 foot lances, and bow-wielding light cavalry, without the aid of bows or firearms. [3] This was a feat of war almost unheard of in medieval history, a feat which even the heavily armored Roman legions proved themselves incapable of against the Parthians, [4]and left Martel a unique place in history as the savior of Europe [5] and a brilliant general in an age not known for its generalship.


After Tours

In the subsequent decade, Charles led the Frankish army against the eastern duchies, Bavaria and Alemannia, and the southern duchies, Aquitaine and Provence. He dealt with the ongoing conflict with the Frisians and Saxons to his northeast with some success, but full conquest of the Saxons and their incorporation into the Frankish empire would wait for his grandson Charlemagne, primarily because Martel concentrated the bulk of his efforts against Muslim expansion.

So instead of concentrating on conquest to his east, he continued expanding Frankish authority in the west, and denying the Emirate of Córdoba a foothold in Europe beyond Al-Andalus. After his victory at Tours, Martel continued on in campaigns in 736 and 737 to drive other Muslim armies from bases in Gaul after they again attempted to get a foothold in Europe beyond Al-Andalus.


Wars from 732-737

Between his victory of 732 and 735, Charles reorganized the kingdom of Burgundy, replacing the counts and dukes with his loyal supporters, thus strengthening his hold on power. He was forced, by the ventures of Radbod, duke of the Frisians (719-734), son of the Duke Aldegisel who had accepted the missionaries Willibrord and Boniface, to invade independence-minded Frisia again in 734. In that year, he slew the duke, who had expelled the Christian missionaries, in battle and so wholly subjugated the populace (he destroyed every pagan shrine) that the people were peaceful for twenty years after.

The dynamic changed in 735 because of the death of Odo the Great, who had been forced to acknowledge, albeit reservedly, the suzerainty of Charles in 719. Though Charles wished to unite the duchy directly to himself and went there to elicit the proper homage of the Aquitainians, the nobility proclaimed Odo's son, Hunold, whose dukeship Charles recognised when the Umayyads invaded Provence the next year, and who equally was forced to acknowledge Charles as overlord as he had no hope of holding off the Muslims alone.

This naval Arab invasion was headed by Abdul Rahman's son. It landed in Narbonne in 736 and moved at once to reinforce Arles and move inland. Charles temporarily put the conflict with Hunold on hold, and descended on the Provençal strongholds of the Umayyads. In 736, he retook Montfrin and Avignon, and Arles and Aix-en-Provence with the help of Liutprand, King of the Lombards. Nîmes, Agde, and Béziers, held by Islam since 725, fell to him and their fortresses were destroyed. He crushed one Umayyad army at Arles, as that force sallied out of the city, and then took the city itself by a direct and brutal frontal attack, and burned it to the ground to prevent its use again as a stronghold for Umayyad expansion. He then moved swiftly and defeated a mighty host outside of Narbonnea at the River Berre, but failed to take the city. Military historians believe he could have taken it, had he chosen to tie up all his resources to do so—but he believed his life was coming to a close, and he had much work to do to prepare for his sons to take control of the Frankish realm. A direct frontal assault, such as took Arles, using rope ladders and rams, plus a few catapults, simply was not sufficient to take Narbonne without horrific loss of life for the Franks, troops Martel felt he could not lose. Nor could he spare years to starve the city into submission, years he needed to set up the administration of an empire his heirs would reign over. He left Narbonne therefore, isolated and surrounded, and his son would return to liberate it for Christianity. Provence, however, he successfully rid of its foreign occupiers, and crushed all foreign armies able to advance Islam further.

Notable about these campaigns was Charles' incorporation, for the first time, of heavy cavalry with stirrups to augment his phalanx. His ability to coordinate infantry and cavalry veterans was unequaled in that era and enabled him to face superior numbers of invaders, and to decisively defeat them again and again. Some historians believe the Battle against the main Muslim force at the River Berre, near Narbonne, in particular was as important a victory for Christian Europe as Tours. In Barbarians, Marauders, and Infidels, Antonio Santosuosso, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Western Ontario, and considered an expert historian in the era in dispute, puts forth an interesting modern opinion on Martel, Tours, and the subsequent campaigns against Rahman's son in 736-737. Santosuosso presents a compelling case that these later defeats of invading Muslim armies were at least as important as Tours in their defence of Western Christendom and the preservation of Western monasticism, the monasteries of which were the centers of learning which ultimately led Europe out of her Middle Ages. He also makes a compelling argument, after studying the Arab histories of the period, that these were clearly armies of invasion, sent by the Caliph not just to avenge Tours, but to begin the conquest of Christian Europe and bring it into the Caliphate.

Further, unlike his father at Tours, Rahman's son in 736-737 knew that the Franks were a real power, and that Martel personally was a force to be reckoned with. He had no intention of allowing Martel to catch him unawares and dictate the time and place of battle, as his father had, and concentrated instead on seizing a substantial portion of the coastal plains around Narbonne in 736 and heavily reinforced Arles as he advanced inland. They planned from there to move from city to city, fortifying as they went, and if Martel wished to stop them from making a permanent enclave for expansion of the Caliphate, he would have to come to them, in the open, where, he, unlike his father, would dictate the place of battle. All worked as he had planned, until Martel arrived, albeit more swiftly than the Moors believed he could call up his entire army. Unfortunately for Rahman's son, however, he had overestimated the time it would take Martel to develop heavy cavalry equal to that of the Muslims. The Caliphate believed it would take a generation, but Martel managed it in five short years. Prepared to face the Frankish phalanx, the Muslims were totally unprepared to face a mixed force of heavy cavalry and infantry in a phalanx. Thus, Charles again championed Christianity and halted Muslim expansion into Europe, as the window was closing on Islamic ability to do so. These defeats, plus those at the hands of Leo in Anatolia were the last great attempt at expansion by the Umayyad Caliphate before the destruction of the dynasty at the Battle of the Zab, and the rending of the Caliphate forever, especially the utter destruction of the Umayyad army at River Berre near Narbonne in 737.


In 737, at the tail end of his campaigning in Provence and Septimania, the king, Theuderic IV, died. Martel, titling himself maior domus and princeps et dux Francorum, did not appoint a new king and nobody acclaimed one. The throne lay vacant until Martel's death. As the historian Charles Oman says (The Dark Ages, pg 297), "he cared not for name or style so long as the real power was in his hands."

Gibbon has said Martel was "content with the titles of Mayor or Duke of the Franks, but he deserved to become the father of a line of kings," which he did. Gibbon also says of him, "in the public danger, he was summoned by the voice of his country."

The interregnum, the final four years of Charles' life, was more peaceful than most of it had been and much of his time was now spent on administrative and organisational plans to create a more efficient state. Though, in 738, he compelled the Saxons of Westphalia to do him homage and pay tribute, and in 739 checked an uprising in Provence, the rebels being under the leadership of Maurontus. Charles set about integrating the outlying realms of his empire into the Frankish church. He erected four dioceses in Bavaria (Salzburg, Regensburg, Freising, and Passau) and gave them Boniface as archbishop and metropolitan over all Germany east of the Rhine, with his seat at Mainz. Boniface had been under his protection from 723 on; indeed the saint himself explained to his old friend, Daniel of Winchester, that without it he could neither administer his church, defend his clergy, nor prevent idolatry. It was Saint Boniface who had defended Charles most stoutly for his deeds in seizing ecclesiastical lands to pay his army in the days leading to Tours, as one doing what he must to defend Christianity. In 739, Pope Gregory III begged Charles for his aid against Liutprand, but Charles was loathe to fight his onetime ally and ignored the Papal plea. Nonetheless, the Papal applications for Frankish protection showed how far Martel had come from the days he was tottering on excommunication, and set the stage for his son and grandson to literally rearrange Italy to suit the Papacy, and protect it.


Charles Martel died on October 22, 741, at Quierzy-sur-Oise in what is today the Aisne département in the Picardy region of France. He was buried at Saint Denis Basilica in Paris. His territories were divided among his adult sons a year earlier: to Carloman he gave Austrasia and Alemannia (with Bavaria as a vassal), to Pippin the Younger Neustria and Burgundy (with Aquitaine as a vassal), and to Grifo nothing, though some sources indicate he intended to give him a strip of land between Neustria and Austrasia.

Gibbon called him "the hero of the age" and declared "Christendom ... delivered ... by the genius and good fortune of one man, Charles Martel." A strong argument can be made Gibbon was correct on both counts.


At the beginning of Charles Martel's career, he had many internal opponents and felt the need to appoint his own kingly claimant, Clotaire IV. By his end, however, the dynamics of rulership in Francia had changed, no hallowed Meroving was needed, neither for defence nor legitimacy: Charles divided his realm between his sons without opposition (though he ignored his young son Bernard). In between, he strengthened the Frankish state by consistently defeating, through superior generalship, the host of hostile foreign nations which beset it on all sides, including the heathen Saxons, which his grandson Charlemagne would fully subdue, and Moors, which he halted on a path of continental domination.

Though he never cared about titles, his son Pippin did, and finally asked the Pope "who should be King, he who has the title, or he who has the power?" The Pope, highly dependent on Frankish armies for his independence from Lombard and Byzantine power (the Byzantine emperor still considered himself to be the only legitimate "Roman Emperor", and thus, ruler of all of the provinces of the ancient empire, whether recognised or not), declared for "he who had the power" and immediately crowned Pippin.

Decades later, in 800, Pippin's son Charlemagne was crowned emperor by the Pope, further extending the principle by delegitimising the nominal authority of the Byzantine emperor in the Italian peninsula (which had, by then, shrunk to encompass little more than Apulia and Calabria at best) and ancient Roman Gaul, including the Iberian outposts Charlmagne had established in the Marca Hispanica across the Pyrenees, what today forms Catalonia. In short, though the Byzantine Emperor claimed authority over all the old Roman Empire, as the legitimate "Roman" Emperor, and while legally this may have been true, it was simply not reality. The bulk of the Western Roman Empire had come under Carolingian rule, the Byzantine Emperor having had almost no authority in the West since the sixth century, though Charlemagne, a consummate politician, preferred to avoid an open breach with Constantinople. An institution unique in history was being born: the Holy Roman Empire. Though the sardonic Voltaire ridiculed its nomenclature, saying that the Holy Roman Empire was "neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire," it constituted an enormous political power for a time, especially under the Saxon and Salian dynasties and, to a lesser, extent, the Hohenstaufen. It lasted until 1806, by then it was a nonentity. Though his grandson became its first emperor, the "empire" such as it was, was largely born during the reign of Charles Martel.

Charles was that rarest of commodities in the Middle Ages: a brilliant strategic general, who also was a tactical commander par excellence, able in the heat of battle to adapt his plans to his foe's forces and movement — and amazingly, to defeat them repeatedly, especially when, as at Tours, they were far superior in men and weaponry, and at Berre and Narbonne, when they were superior in numbers of brave fighting men. Charles had the last quality which defines genuine greatness in a military commander: he foresaw the dangers of his foes, and prepared for them with care; he used ground, time, place, and fierce loyalty of his troops to offset his foe's superior weaponry and tactics; third, he adapted, again and again, to the enemy on the battlefield, cooly shifting to compensate for the unforeseen and unforeseeable.

Gibbon, whose tribute to Martel has been noted, was not alone among the great mid era historians in fervently praising Martel; Thomas Arnold ranks the victory of Charles Martel even higher than the victory of Arminius in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in its impact on all of modern history:

"Charles Martel's victory at Tours was among those signal deliverances which have affected for centuries the happiness of mankind." [History of the later Roman Commonwealth, vol ii. p. 317.]

German historians are especially ardent in their praise of Martel and in their belief that he saved Europe and Christianity from then all-conquering Islam, praising him also for driving back the ferocious Saxon barbarians on his borders. Schlegel speaks of this " mighty victory " in terms of fervent gratitude, and tells how " the arm of Charles Martel saved and delivered the Christian nations of the West from the deadly grasp of all-destroying Islam", and Ranke points out,

"as one of the most important epochs in the history of the world, the commencement of the eighth century, when on the one side Mohammedanism threatened to overspread Italy and Gaul, and on the other the ancient idolatry of Saxony and Friesland once more forced its way across the Rhine. In this peril of Christian institutions, a youthful prince of Germanic race, Karl Martell, arose as their champion, maintained them with all the energy which the necessity for self-defence calls forth, and finally extended them into new regions."

In 1922 and 1923, Belgian historian Henri Pirenne published a series of papers, known collectively as the "Pirenne Thesis", which remain influential to this day. Pirenne held that the Roman Empire continued, in the Frankish realms, up until the time of the Arab conquests in the 7th century. These conquests disrupted Mediterranean trade routes leading to a decline in the European economy. Such continued disruption would have meant complete disaster except for Charles Martel's halting of Islamic expansion into Europe from 732 on. What he managed to preserve led to the Carolingian Renaissance, named after him.

Professor Santosuosso [7] perhaps sums up Martel best when he talks about his coming to the rescue of his Christian allies in Provence, and driving the Muslims back into the Iberian Peninsula forever in the mid and late 730's::

"After assembling forces at Saragossa the Muslims entered French territory in 735, crossed the River Rhone and captured and looted Arles. From there they struck into the heart of Provence, ending with the capture of Avignon, despite strong resistance. Islamic forces remained in French territory for about four years, carrying raids to Lyons, Burgundy, and Piedmont. Again Charles Martel came to the rescue, reconquering most of the lost territories in two campaigns in 736 and 739, except for the city of Narbonne, which finally fell in 759. The second (Muslim) expedition was probably more dangerous than the first to Poiters. Yet its failure (at Martel's hands) put an end to any serious Muslim expedition across the Pyrenees (forever)."

In the Netherlands, a vital part of the Carolingian Empire, and in the low countries, he is considered a hero. In France and especially in Germany, he is revered as a hero of epic proportions.

Skilled as an administrator and ruler, Martel organized what would become the medieval European government: a system of fiefdoms, loyal to barons, counts, dukes and ultimately the King, or in his case, simply maior domus and princeps et dux Francorum. ("First or Dominant Mayor and Prince of the Franks") His close coordination of church with state began the medieval pattern for such government. He created what would become the first western standing army since the fall of Rome by his maintaining a core of loyal veterans around which he organized the normal feudal levies. In essence, he changed Europe from a horde of barbarians fighting with one another, to an organized state.

Beginning of the Reconquista

Although it took another two generations for the Franks to drive all the Arab garrisons out of Septimania and across the Pyrenees, Charles Martel's halt of the invasion of French soil turned the tide of Islamic advances, and the unification of the Frankish kingdoms under Martel, his son Pippin the Younger, and his grandson Charlemagne created a western power which prevented the Emirate of Córdoba from expanding over the Pyrenees. Martel, who in 732 was on the verge of excommunication, instead was recognised by the Church as its paramount defender. Pope Gregory II wrote him more than once, asking his protection and aid [6], and he remained, till his death, fixated on stopping the Muslims. Martel's son Pippin the Younger kept his father's promise and returned and took Narbonne by siege in 759, and his grandson, Charlemagne, actually established the Marca Hispanica across the Pyrenees in part of what today is Catalonia, reconquering Girona in 785 and Barcelona in 801. This sector of what is now Spain was then called "The Moorish Marches" by the Carolingians, who saw it as not just a check on the Muslims in Hispania, but the beginning of taking the entire country back. This formed a permanent buffer zone against Islam, which became the basis, along with the King of Asturias, named Pelayo (718-737, who started his fight against the Moors in the mountains of Covadonga, 722) and his descendants, for the Reconquista until all of the Muslims were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula.

Military legacy

First, and foremost, Charles Martel will always be remembered for his victory at Tours. Creasy argues that the Martel victory "preserved the relics of ancient and the germs of modern civilizations." Gibbon called those eight days in 732, the week leading up to Tours, and the battle itself, "the events that rescued our ancestors of Britain, and our neighbors of Gaul [France], from the civil and religious yoke of the Koran." Paul Akers, in his editorial on Charles Martel, says for those who value christianity "you might spare a minute sometime today, and every October, to say a silent 'thank you' to a gang of half-savage Germans and especially to their leader, Charles 'The Hammer' Martel." [7].

In his vision of what would be necessary for him to withstand a larger force and superior technology (the Muslim horsemen had the stirrup, which made the first knights possible), he, daring not to send his few horsemen against the Islamic cavalry, used his army to fight in a formation used by the ancient Greeks to withstand superior numbers and weapons by discipline, courage, and a willingness to die for their cause: a phalanx. He had trained a core of his men year round, using mostly Church funds, and some had literally been with him since his earliest days after his father's death. It was this hard core of disciplined veterans that won the day for him at Tours. Hanson emphasizes that Martel's greatest accomplishment as a General may have been his ability to keep his troops under control. This absolute iron discipline saved his infantry from the fate of so many infantrymen - such as the Saxons at Hastings - who broke formation and were slaughtered piecemeal. After using this infantry force by itself at Tours, he studied the foe's forces and further adapted to them, initially using stirrups and saddles recovered from the foe's dead horses, and armour from the dead horsemen. After 732, he began the integration into his army of heavy cavalry, using the stirrup and mailed armour, training his infantry to fight in conjunction with cavalry, a tactic which stood him in good stead during his campaigns of 736-7, especially at the Battle of Narbonne. His incorporation of heavy armoured cavalry into the western forces created the first "knights" in the west.

Martel earned his reputation for brilliant generalship, in an age generally bereft of same, by his ability to use what he had, integrating new ideas and technology. As a consequence he was undefeated from 716 to his death against a wide range of opponents, including the Muslim cavalry, at that time the world's best, and the fierce barbarian Saxons on his own borders, and despite virtually always being outnumbered. He was the only general in the MIddle Ages in Europe to use the eastern battle technique of feigned retreat. His ability to attack where he was least expected, when he was least expected, and how he was least expected, were legendary. The process of the development of the famous chivalry of France continued in the Edict of Pistres of his great-great-grandson and namesake Charles the Bald.

The defeats Martel inflicted on the Muslims were absolutely vital in that the split in the Islamic world left the Caliphate unable to mount an all out attack on Europe via its Iberian stronghold after 750. His ability to meet this challenge, until the Muslims self-destructed, is of macrohistorical importance, and is why Dante writes of him in Heaven as one of the "Defenders of the Faith." After 750, the door to western Europe, the Iberian emirate, was in the hands of the Umayyads, while most of the remainder of the Muslim world came under the control of the Abbasids, making an invasion of Europe a logistical impossibility while the two Muslim empires battled. This put off Islamic invasion of Europe until the Turkish conquest of the Balkans half a millennium later.

John H. Haaren says in “Famous Men of the Middle Ages

”The battle of Tours, or Poitiers, as it should be called, is regarded as one of the decisive battles of the world. It decided that Christians, and not Moslems, should be the ruling power in Europe. Charles Martel is especially celebrated as the hero of this battle.”

Just as his grandson, Charlemagne, would become famous for his swift and unexpected movements in his campaigns, Charles was legendary for never doing what his enemies forecast he would do. It was this ability to do the unforeseen, and move far faster than his opponents believed he could, that characterized the military career of Charles Martel.


[edit] Conclusion

J.M. Roberts says of Charles Martel in his note on the Carolingians on page 315 of his 1993 History of the World:

It (the Carolingian line) produced Charles Martel, the soldier who turned the Arabs back at Tours, and the supporter of Saint Boniface, the Evangelizer of Germany. This is a considerable double mark to have left on the history of Europe."

Gibbon perhaps summarized Charles Martel's legacy most eloquently: "in a laborious administration of 24 years he had restored and supported the dignity of the the activity of a warrior who in the same campaign coud display his banner on the Elbe, the Rhone, and shores of the ocean."

It is notable that the Northmen did not begin their European raids until after the death of Martel's grandson, Charlemagne. They had the naval capacity to begin those raids at least three generations earlier, but chose not to challenge Martel, his son Pippin, or his grandson, Charlemagne. This was probably fortunate for Martel, who despite his enormous gifts, would probably not have been able to beat off the Vikings in addition to the Muslims, Saxons, and everyone else he defeated. However, it is notable that again, despite the ability to do so, (the Danes had constructed defenses to defend from counterattacks by land, and had the ability to launch their wholesale sea raids as early as Martel's reign), they chose not to challenge Charles Martel.

Family and children

Charles Martel married twice:

  1. Rotrude of Treves (690-724) (daughter of St. Leutwinus, Bishop of Treves), with children:
    1. Hiltrud (d. 754), married Odilo I, Duke of Bavaria
    2. Carloman
    3. Landrade (Landres), married Sigrand, Count of Hesbania
    4. Auda, Aldana, or Alane, married Thierry IV, Count of Autun and Toulouse
    5. Pippin the Younger
  2. Swanhild, with child:
    1. Grifo

Charles Martel also had a mistress, Ruodhaid:

  1. Bernard (b. before 732-787)
  2. Hieronymus
  3. Remigius, archbishop of Rouen (d. 771)
  4. Ian (d. 783)



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